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Abstract
Material efficiency is indispensable to reaching agreed targets for industry’s energy and carbon
emissions. Yet, in the EU, the energy- and emissions-saving potentials of this strategy continue
to be framed as secondary outcomes of resource-related policies. Understanding why material
efficiency has been overlooked as an energy/climate solution is a prerequisite for proposing
ways of changing its framing, but existing studies have failed to do so. This paper fills this gap
by triangulating interviews, policy documents and three policy theories: namely, historical
and rational choice institutionalism, and multiple streams framework. Factors discouraging
material efficiency as an energy and climate strategy include: difficulties in reframing the
prevailing rationale to pursue it; the inadequacy of monitored indicators; the lack of high-level
political buy-in from DG Energy and Clima; the ETS policy lock-in; uncoordinated policy
management across Directorates; the lack of a designated industry lobby. Policy solutions are
proposed. Before 2030, these are limited to minor amendments, e.g. guidance on embodied
energy calculations or industry standards. Post-2030, more radical interventions are possible,
such as introducing new fiscal drivers, re-designing the ETS emissions cap or benchmarks for
allowances. This evidence suggests that the transition to a low-carbon industry will require
Member State- and industry-level action.
Keywords: Material efficiency; energy and climate policies; multiple stream framework; new
institutionalism; rational choice institutionalism; resource efficiency.
Nomenclature
Abbreviations
BREF Best Practice Reference document GhG Greenhouse Gas
CE Circular Economy HI Historical Institutionalism
DG Directorate General IED Industrial Emissions Directive
EC European Commission JRC Joint Research Center
EE Energy Efficiency LCA Life-cycle Assessment
EEA European Environment Agency ME Material Efficiency
EED Energy Efficiency Directive MSF Multiple Streams Framework
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism
EU European Union RE Resource Efficiency
1 Material efficiency: a tool to reduce energy use in heavy industries
In 2016, industry was responsible for over a quarter of the European Union’s (EU) total final
energy use (Eurostat, 2018), and just under half of this was consumed in energy-intensive
industries. Improving energy efficiency (EE) in these industries is therefore key to reduce
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and energy demand (EC (2016b)) in the region. Yet potential
gains from EE have proved to be limited compared to the scale of CO2 emissions reduction
targets (Allwood et al. (2010); Fischedick et al. (2014)).
There is a growing body of academic literature which contends that reducing the use of energy-
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intensive materials through material efficiency (ME)1 – using less materials to provide the
same service – could be a complementary strategy to address the emissions gap. Allwood et al.
(2011) propose nine strategies to improve ME: light-weighting, re-using, re-manufacturing,
recycling, diverting scrap, extending product lives, using products more intensely, improving
process yields, and substituting materials. Several studies have quantified the technical
potential for improvement of some of these strategies in energy-intensive sectors, e.g. steel
(Allwood and Cullen (2012); Milford et al. (2013); Pauliuk and Mu¨ller (2014)), aluminium
(Cullen and Allwood (2013)), paper (Griffin et al. (2018); Van Ewijk et al. (2017)), cement
(Kajaste and Hurme (2016)) and chemicals (Griffin et al. (2017)). Overall, Cooper et al.
(2017b) estimate that 6-11% of the energy used to support economic activity, both globally
and in the EU, can be saved by improving ME. In steelmaking, Cullen et al. (2012) reveal
that over a quarter of the global liquid steel produced is lost in casting (74 Mt), forming (99
Mt) and fabrication (186 Mt).
ME also has proponents outside of academia, with interest from the International Energy
Agency (IEA, 2015), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Fischedick et al. (2014))
and United Nations Environmental Programme (Etkins and Hughes (2017)). All three signal
it is an under-explored CO2 mitigation strategy which merits further policy attention.
In the European Commission (EC), policies that support ME belong within the environmental
policy remit (EC (2011a)) – in the Directorate General (DG) for Environment – rather than
energy and climate. These environmental policies aim to guarantee resource availability,
reduce price volatility and drive economic growth (EEA (2010, 2016); EC (2011b)), framing
impacts on energy use and emissions as potential secondary outcomes. Industrial policies
aimed at reducing energy and emissions, however, have yet to leverage ME as a tool to achieve
the region’s binding energy and emissions targets. In fact, Skelton and Allwood (2017) and
Neuhoff et al. (2016) have showed that the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – the EU’s main
climate policy – provides inadequate incentives for material efficiency.
This paper sets out to answer two research questions:
1. Why is material efficiency not part of the EU’s energy and climate policy remit?
2. How could it become a policy option to help reduce energy and emissions?
2 Review
Answering these questions requires: an understanding of the current EU energy, climate
and resource policies (Section 2.1); an assessment of existing studies that investigate the
prominence, or otherwise, of ME in these policy areas (Section 2.2); and a review of frameworks
that examine the agenda-setting process (Section 2.3). Together, these three strands of
literature inform the research approach to this study (Section 2.4).
1The terms ME and resource efficiency (RE) are often used interchangeably. Here, the term ME denotes the
strategies identified by Allwood et al. (2011), as well as industrial symbiosis – the recovery of by-products.
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2.1 The EU’s energy, climate and resource-related policies
The EC has a breadth of policy tools at hand to incentivise and enforce the reduction of energy
and material use (the combination of which we denote as ‘resources’) in heavy industries.
Currently, four main policy areas can influence this: (1) the Energy Union; (2) DG Energy
(EC (2006, 2011b, 2014d)); (3) DG Environment (EC, 2011a, 2014c); and (4) DG Clima.2
Figure 1 uses the policy pyramid approach (Reinaud and Goldberg (2011)) to characterise the
EU policy landscape shaping resource use in industry. Policies are divided into three groups:
effort-defining policies; supporting measures that encourage the delivery of these efforts;
implementation tools that help operationalise these3. See Table A.1 for more details.
Figure 1: Pyramid for EU’s climate, environment and energy policies related to energy-intensive industries. Colours
indicate the policy area in charge of the given policy.
Starting at the top of the pyramid, there are three effort-defining policies for heavy industries,
2Aside from these, DG Growth and other Commission-wide initiatives can occasionally indirectly impact
industrial energy and material use (as shown in Figure 1 and 2).
3We exclude two policies Circle Economy (2017): Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Green Public
Procurement (GPP). The former, although effective in areas such as batteries, electric vehicles and packaging,
is not particularly relevant to heavy industries. Similarly, GPP only has an indirect impact.
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all motivated by the need to reduce energy and emissions: the 2020 climate and energy
package; the 2030 climate and energy framework (EC (2008a, 2014a)); the Energy Union.
These impose two economy-wide targets for 2020 and 2030; one on emissions (20% and 40%
reduction) and one on energy use (20% and 27% reduction).
The ETS is the main supporting measure for these effort-defining policies (EC (2009a)).
Other regulatory mechanisms that provide tangible support include the: (1) Eco-design
directive, which targets energy-consuming devices; (2) Energy Efficiency Directive (EED),
which enforces energy auditing in large enterprises (Article 8); (3) IED, which defines best
available techniques for installation permits (EC (2009b)); (4) the Raw Materials Initiative,
which aims to improve the market for secondary materials (EC (2008c)); (5) waste legislation,
which is now under the Circular Economy (CE) package (EC (2015b)). The remaining
supporting measures mainly provide the foundations from which longer-term progress can be
initiated: roadmaps, monitoring frameworks and research funding, e.g. Horizon 2020.
At the bottom of the pyramid, a number of implementation instruments are available, which en-
able engagement with the wider policy community. For example: training programmes, stake-
holder platforms, regulation guidelines, impact assessments and public consultations.
Visualising the coverage of the most relevant ME measures across existing EU policies
– portrayed in Figure 2 – reveals that only a subset of these are currently covered by
DG Environment, with little support offered for measures such as light-weighting or yield
improvements. Policies targeted at industrial energy use primarily focus on heating, cooling,
recovering waste heat, and fuel switching. The EU’s flagship climate policy, the ETS, provides
weak incentives to introduce any ME strategies (Skelton and Allwood (2017); Aidt et al.
(2017); Neuhoff et al. (2016)), and IED’s guidelines on best practice do not explicitly cover
ME and target non-CO2 emissions
4.
2.2 Analyses of EU-level material efficiency policies
Section 2.1 shows that ME cuts across multiple Directorates and policy objectives and
the literature examining ME-related policies is similarly diverse. The reviewed studies,
summarised in Table 1, can be grouped into four categories, those which investigate: (1) the
suitability of ME indicators; (2) the barriers to ME; (3) the analysis of policy agendas; (4)
options for and impacts of policy interventions. From these, the most relevant papers are
highlighted with asterisks (*) in Table 1.
Mehlhart et al. (2016) investigated the, as yet, under-explored energy-saving potential of ME
as an option to achieve energy targets. The report identifies barriers only for a subset of ME
measures in different sectors, including heavy industry, and proposes remedial interventions.
Similarly, Scott et al. (2017) analyse ways in which EU product policies could be extended
to include aspects on material and product use; they propose modifying these to include
4They only cover the production facility, limiting the extent to which they can regulate upstream environmental
impacts and outgoing material streams – where gaps for ME improvements lie (EPA (2016))
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Figure 2: Non-exhaustive overview of policies currently influencing or covering ME and EE; Plastic strat. (Plastic
strategy).
embodied emissions – currently unaddressed by the ETS. Yet, Mehlhart et al. (2016), do not
consider the complete policy landscape shown in Figure 1, and Scott et al. (2017) provide
no empirical evidence. Neither study investigates the lack of attention given to ME in
energy/climate policies, but rather take this as their starting point.
Two studies examine the economic rationale for policies that incentivise ME in industry.
Neuhoff et al. (2016) and Skelton and Allwood (2017) specifically analysed the potential role
of the ETS in stimulating ME. Neuhoff et al. (2016) propose the inclusion of a consumption
charge, and Skelton and Allwood (2017) suggest the removal of distortive taxes and the
implementation of carbon leakage exemptions that “are independent of embodied carbon”.
Despite valuable analyses, they, again, fail to reference the broader policy landscape, and
provide limited insight into the political and behavioural aspects taking part.
Cooper-Searle et al. (2017) use the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) from Kingdon (1984)
to investigate why ME is not a bigger part of the UK climate policy agenda. The authors
go beyond quantitative economic analyses, and provide meaningful insights into the aspects
influencing policymakers’ decisions. Yet, restricted to the UK’s automotive sector, it provides
limited insight into the agenda-setting process for climate strategies at EU-level.
The EU is committed to reduce energy use by 20% before 2020 and by at least 27% before
2030. The successful adoption of ME in heavy industries is key in achieving these. None of
the studies in the literature investigates why the EU’s energy and climate policies continue
to under-leverage this. Yet, understanding why an issue has been overlooked by policymakers
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is a prerequisite for proposing ways of changing this.
2.3 Public policy theories: explaining the agenda-setting process
The complexity of policy formation has resulted in a rich volume of conceptual frameworks
or theories that seek to explain why specific issues do or do not become part of specific policy
agendas. These provide researchers with a simplified yet systematic method through which
to understand behavioural, institutional and political factors affecting the agenda-setting
process. This section reviews three policy frameworks that are appropriate to analyse the
inclusion, or omission, of a technical solution such as ME, in the EU’s energy and climate
agenda. These are: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), New Institutionalism, and the
Multiple Stream Framework (MSF).
Borrowing from neo-classical economics, Rational Choice Institutionalism assumes that
individuals are homogeneous rational actors who compare expected benefits and costs of their
actions prior to adoption (Hindess (1984); Ostrom (1991)) and whose choices are constrained
by institutions. In the EU, RCI has provided the theoretical foundations for other theories of
the policy process, such as the ‘transaction-cost approach (Huber and Shipan (2003)), and
has served as a means of formulating formal macro-economic models (Pollack (2006)).
This simplistic portrayal of the policy process and its actors, however, puts “politics in
service of the economy” (Meadwell (2005)) and fails to capture the complexity of actors
motivations, their decision-making process and the reconciliation of policy trade-offs seen in
practice (Norgaard (1996)). Lindblom (1959) has long criticised RCI for its inability to explain
incremental policy changes. Pollack (2006) concludes that RCI has limited applicability; it is
most valuable when individual’s decisions are most relevant, where there is sufficient internal
expertise, and where institutional structures and rules are clearly defined.
This has prompted modifications to the original theory – often categorised under the rubric
of “new institutionalism” – by expanding on the motivations of actors, the mechanisms of
policy change and the relevance of historical developments. Among these, two prominent
theories have received most academic attention: (1) historical institutionalism (HI), which
focuses on understanding the relevance of path dependency in new policy developments (e.g.
Pedersen (2017); Mahoney (2000)); (2) sociological institutionalism, which posits institutions
are shaped by culture, experience and behaviour instead of rationality (e.g. Axford (2015);
Lombardo and Forest (2015)).
Other new-institutionalist theories investigated the effect of institutions on the interactions
between actors. For example, to explain the relationships between EU policymakers, Princen
and Rhinard (2006) – based on Cobb (1976) – proposed two types of institutional dynamics:
high politics, where issues become part of an agenda from top-down political interventions;
and low politics, where an issue is raised by junior members. The rationale for making this
distinction is that the two routes have different features (see Table A.3).
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MSF developed by Kingdon (1984), incorporates exogenous factors that remain unexplored in
institutionalist theories. Based on bounded rationality, this theory characterises the transience
of opportunities available to bring problems to the attention of policymakers. Although
originally informed by US policy developments, MSF has universal applicability and has been
applied to understand EU agenda-setting process (see examples in Table A.4). MSF has two
main advantages: it explicitly considers the characteristics of policy solutions; it does not
rely on an understanding of policy processes over long time periods (Sabatier et al. (1999)),
which is beneficial for the study of ME, a relatively new topic. Yet, as argued by Brunner
(2008), MSF is less appropriate for capturing institutional and behavioural aspects.
This literature reveals that no single theory can capture all the factors influencing whether
specific policy issues are included or omitted from policy agendas. In fact, Cairney (2007)
contends that studies relying on several frameworks provide more complete explanations of
policy change and its drivers, especially if these studies “do not seek confirm the value of one
particular model’ ’. We therefore posit that a combination of theories is needed to assess why
ME is not part of the energy and climate agendas; the exact combination of which will be
determined from the evidence collected.
2.4 Research proposal
This section confirms that a comprehensive explanation of why ME is omitted from energy
and climate agendas in the EU – where the entire gamut of EU energy, climate and resource
policies is considered – is missing. It also shows that a combination of policy frameworks is
likely to provide the richest explanation of why this is the case. Based on this, we seek to
provide two contributions to knowledge. First, to explain why ME is yet to become part of
the energy and climate agendas by investigating all relevant policy areas that could promote
ME in heavy industry. Second, to explore interventions through which to integrate ME in
energy and climate strategies, and thereby to contribute to the discussion on how to facilitate
the transition to a low-carbon heavy industry.
3 Method
Figure 3 portrays a schematic explaining the method used to collect and analyse the evidence.
The rest of the section outlines how a combination of frameworks are applied to our study,
expanding on the literature described in Section 2.3 and the empirical data collected.
Rather than rigidly adhering to a particular policy lens, our results are structured based
on a combination of conceptual frameworks focused on agenda-setting – MSF, HI and RCI
(Cairney and Jones (2016); Kingdon (1984); Sabatier et al. (1999); Gottweis (2007)). The
content of these results is founded on evidence from policy documents (Section 3.2) and
semi-structured interviews (Section 3.3). These two data sources were manually coded and
combined to provide a more comprehensive overview of the variables affecting the integration
of ME in energy/climate policies.
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Figure 3: Overview of method used to analyse the setting of the EU policy agenda
Studies on the EU’s agenda-setting process often take a neo-functionalist approach and
consider the Commission as the main decision-maker (Herweg (2016); Richardson (2001);
Zahariadis (2008)) – even if this represents just one of the multiple relevant EU institutions.
This analysis follows this assumption, and is based around EU- rather than the Member-
state-level agendas, with a specific focus on the Commission.
3.1 Defining the conceptual framework
As part of the manual coding process, interviews and policy documents were triangulated
with policy-theory literature to identify the variables influencing policymakers’ decisions.
These were structured into three sections (Figure 4): problem perception, institutional and
political factors, and solution readiness. The following paragraphs describe each of these
sections in turn. Table 2 details why the specific variables in Figure 4 were included and on
how these influential factors were modified from their respective original frameworks.
Problem perception is assessed first. This, borrowing from Kingdon’s problem stream (Kingdon
(2003, 1984)), includes evaluating the evidence pertaining to: (1) how ME solutions are
understood among the policy community; (2) the indicators used to track progress on EE, RE
and emissions; and (3) events that may have sparked the attention of policymakers working
in these areas.
The influence of institutional and political factors is examined next. This section combines
variables from Kingdon’s political stream and the institutionalist approaches – both Historical
and Rational Choice Institutionalism. Four variables that can encourage policymakers to take
up or disregard a particular solution are considered: (1) the impact of vertical hierarchy –
the nature of the interactions between different management levels; (2) the influence of policy
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Figure 4: Conceptual framework used to structure the analysis of interviews and policy documents
ownership, that is, which venues own what policies; (3) the effect of policy inheritance, or in
other words the influence of past policy developments; and (4) the role of individualism, i.e.
rational behaviour. These elements also include the high- and low-level modes, described in
Section 2.3, which explain the dynamics of the Commission’s institutional structure.
Last, we explore the readiness of ME as a policy solution. Three specific aspects are covered,
based on interview discussions: the technical feasibility to implement this; whether it aligns
with the prevailing normative values of policymakers – its value acceptance; and the role
played by policy entrepreneurs, i.e. the actors pushing for specific policy solutions. These
aspects are described in Kingdon’s policy and entrepreneurship streams (Kingdon, 1984), and
also widely discussed in the literature (Bache, 2013; Zahariadis, 2008; Herweg, 2016).
3.2 Reviewing policy documents
The review of policy documents helps quantify the prominence of different public problems and
policy solutions over time in each Directorate. Two separate analyses were conducted.
First, individual policy documents were examined in search for relevant themes. These
were chosen according to the variables in Figure 4 above. We researched over ten types
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Table 2: Influential factors according to the associated theory and comments on the relevance to this work
Influencing factor Associated theory Relevance Explanation
Indicators MSF (problems) Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews across all
policy areas
Load MSF (problems) No Not mentioned in interviews
Focusing events MSF (problems) Yes Obtained through the review of policy doc-
uments (Commission meetings), and briefly
discussed in interviews
Feedback MSF (problems) No Not mentioned in interviews
Interest groups MSF (politics) Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews; discus-
sion is limited – data collection is challenging
due to sheer volume of entrepreneurs
Balance of interests MSF (politics) No Not mentioned in interviews
Political ideology MSF (politics) No Not mentioned in interviews
Public mood MSF (politics) No Discarded by EU policy experts (Herweg
(2016))
Budgetary constraints MSF (policy) No Discarded by EU policy experts (Zahariadis
(2008))
Idea acceptance MSF (policy) Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews
Idea feasibility MSF (policy) Yes Discussed in interviews
Network integration MSF (policy) Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews across all
policy areas
Policy windows MSF (windows) No Limited understanding – Challenging to
develop meaningful analysis of windows
throughout the entire period considered
Entrepreneurship MSF (en-
trepreneurs)
Yes The Commission is treated as the main pol-
icy entrepreneur (Herweg (2016); Zahariadis
(2008); Nowak (2010); Maltby (2013))
Path dependence HI Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews regarding
DG Environment
Individualism RCI Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews regarding
DG Environment and the Commission
Institution structure RCI Yes Explicitly mentioned in interviews regarding
DG Environment and the Commission
of documents – more than 30 documents – as summarised in Table A.5 of the Appendix.
Particular focus was placed on the developments of the three most relevant Directorate
Generals (DGs) within the Commission, as identified in Section 2.1: (1) DG Energy; (2) DG
Environment; and (3) DG Clima.
Second, a systematic coding approach was taken to quantitatively assess the historical
importance of energy, climate and environmental topics on the EC’s political agenda. This
was inspired by work from Baumgartner et al. (2002) and later Princen (2009). To do this,
the number of times a word is mentioned in the minutes of the weekly Commissioner meetings
(over 230 documents) was quantified – from the 11th of January 2012 (EC, 2012) to the
12th July of 2017 (EC, 2017a). The words searched included: “energy efficiency”, “resource
efficiency”, “circular economy”, “GhG emissions” and “CO2 emissions”. This serves as an
indicator to evaluate the scope of the EU’s environmental, climate and energy agendas, as
well as the framing of ME across the Commission. The database with all the Commissioner
meeting minutes can be found in EC (2017b).
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3.3 Conducting semi-structured interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen participants from a range of institutions
that are involved in shaping policies that influence industrial resources (materials and energy)
and emissions. These took place between April and October 2017, and lasted between 40 and
60 minutes. Participants covered a wide range of profiles, including junior and senior civil
servants, industry practitioners, consultants, researchers and sustainability officers. Table 3
lists the organisations covered in the interviews.
Table 3: Organisations covered in the semi-structured interviews
Organisation name Type
worldsteel Industrial steel association
Tata steel Steel company
Arcelor Mittal Steel company
International Energy Agency International expert institution
DG Energy European Commission Directorate General
DG Clima European Commission Directorate General
DG Environment European Commission Directorate General
DG Growth European Commission Directorate General
Joint Research Center European research center
Public policy consultancy International expert institution
Interview protocols were prepared prior to the interviews. Table 4 portrays an example.
Although most interviews followed this general structure, these were at times adapted to
reflect interviewee’s priorities and ensure a natural conversation. Guidance on the preparation
of interview structures and questions was obtained from Cloke et al. (2004), Longhurst (2010)
and Cooper-Searle et al. (2017). The questions were designed to provide insights into the
multiple variables identified from the literature (summarised in Section 4). The open-ended
and semi-structured nature of the interviews made it possible to collect and analyse data
simultaneously, and to thereby refine the line of questioning.
Interviews were transcribed verbatim using the F5 software (F5 Networks (2017)). Transcripts
were manually classified into themes according to the variables in Section 3.1. For example,
if participants mention the Commission’s ‘structure’ or ‘hierarchy’, these statements are
categorised under ‘institutional analysis’. Interviewees were asked to review their interview
quotes to ensure their correct interpretation. The combination of policy documents and
interviews made it possible to construct a methodical and thorough explanation of why ME
has received little attention as a tool in energy and climate agendas.
Increasing the sample size proved difficult given the time available to perform this work, and
the overloaded schedules of relevant stakeholders – six people were unable to participate.
4 Problem perception: framing, tracking and receiving feedback
Before taking action, policymakers must first be convinced that a problem exists. In agenda-
setting, many factors affect the perception of a problem, in this case of ME. Our empirical
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Table 4: Example of prepared questions for semi-structured interviews
Personal background
1 What is your job? What does it consist of?
2 Are you involved in making/advising decisions on resource or energy efficiency?
3 Have you been involved in a project concerned with EE/RE in energy-intensive industries?
Questions relevant to the specific organisation
4 How is your organisation involved in making or advising policies on EE/RE/emissions?
5 How were you involved in the EED review consultation?
6 Does your organisation incentivise the implementation of EE/RE/ME measures?
Understanding of link between energy and resource/material efficiency
7 What potential does your organisation see for RE/ME to help reduce energy use?
8 How do you view energy efficiency in relation to other policy areas such as CE and RE?
Perception of problem
9 Do you think there is a need to include material efficiency as a tool in energy/climate policies?
10 Hypothetically, how could your organisation support the integration of ME as a technical option
to meet climate and energy targets?
Barriers to integrating resource/material and energy efficiency policies
11 Thinking about industrial climate and energy policies as a whole, what do you think are the main
barriers to link energy and resource efficiency policies?
evidence suggests that the main factors are: the rationale used to frame it (Section 4.1); the
occurrence of specific predictable events (Section 4.2); and the indicators used to track it
(Section 4.3).
4.1 Issue framing: the case of material efficiency
Figure 5 shows how frequently different topics were discussed in the Commissioner weekly
meetings between 2012 and 2017. Since the launch of the RE roadmap (2011), the Commis-
sion’s interest on RE/CE has steadily increased. Yet, a closer examination reveals that when
CE is discussed, there is no mention of its energy or emissions impacts. In fact, in agreement
with several policy documents (Eurostat (2017); EEA (2010); EC (2011b)), RE/CE are only
discussed in relation to: resource scarcity, economic growth, price increases or security of
supply. Similarly, in meetings when EE and GhG emissions reduction opportunities are
discussed, there is no mention of RE/CE (see Figure 5). This indicates that RE/CE policies
and energy and climate strategies are perceived as disparate policy agendas.
This disconnect is important because resource-related policies from DG Environment are
driven by different rationales to the energy/climate policies from DG Energy and Clima.
Under the environmental remit, RE/CE is driven by rationales of scarcity, criticality, price
increases and volatility. Resource-related fail to prioritise the energy-saving potential of ME,
for two main reasons. First, the rationale for policy intervention guides which materials
should be prioritised. For example, if driven by criticality (Valero et al. (2015)), ME policies
will focus on materials such as cobalt or neodynium, and neglect abundant energy-intensive
materials such as iron or cement. Second, the choice of institutional venue dictates the
stringency of policy enforcement in the EU, i.e. energy/climate targets are binding, whereas
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Figure 5: Topic analysis of weekly Commissioner meetings, covering energy efficiency (EE), resource efficiency (RE),
circular economy (CE) or emissions (GHG), as reflected in the minutes; expressed in percentages. Blue and grey
boxes indicate possible climate-related and unrelated triggering events respectively.
most ME policies, except for waste legislation, are non-binding.
Although it is not apparent from policy documents, interviewees suggested that DG Envi-
ronment has attempted to reframe ME as an energy and climate, beyond an environmental
tool. A report commissioned by DG Environment on the energy-saving potential of RE
(Mehlhart et al. (2016)) reportedly resulted from the fact that “environmental aspects have
not really been at the forefront”. Another interviewee concurred, stating that this report
enabled DG Environment to highlight that “there is also an energy dimension to [ME]”. The
report explicitly states that “while RE policies are worth pursuing in their own right for
reducing environmental pressures, the induced energy savings provide a further rationale for
their urgency”.
There is a precedent for reframing and expanding policy agendas in the EU. Originally, EE
was primarily motivated by energy security and economic growth. However, in 2007, the
Commission launched its first combined energy and climate policy framework (EC, 2008b).
Since then, the convergence between these two issues has continued. For example: there is
now a single Commissioner for Energy and Climate Change; and the Energy Union is due to
combine the governance of energy and climate data collection mechanisms. The reframing of
EE, however, had widespread support from academics and industry experts, including the
IEA (2010, 2013), which is currently more limited for ME.
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4.2 Focusing events: influence of scheduled feedback opportunities
Specific events can turn policymakers’ attention to certain public problems or solutions. These
can be predictable e.g. the scheduled renewal of legislation, or unpredictable e.g. periods of
crises. Evidence from the interviews revealed two points. First, that although unpredictable
events (see Figure 5), might have been potential windows of opportunity for a more integrated
RE/EE/climate policy agenda, this did not happen. Second, that policy entrepreneurs
exploited the opportunity provided by predictable events, such as public consultations, to
voice the need to integrate resource-related policies with energy and climate strategies.
A high-level Commission official explained that “things can come on to the agenda through
consultations” and that the EC “use[s] the responses to the consultations [...] to come up
with new ideas and to understand better the balance of opinions’ ’. Yet, this was not the case
in the two EED consultations conducted in 2014 (EC (2014b)) and 2016 (Directorate-General
for Energy (2016)), where industry stakeholders voiced the need to incorporate ME as a tool
to achieve energy and climate goals: “[EE goals] must be kept in balance with [RE] goals”.
This high-level official, explained that “it was not the judgment of anyone in [DG Energy]
that there was anything in the consultation that we should pick up on”.
Responses suggesting the need to integrate RE and EE/climate policies, however, were sparse,
did not suggest specific policy changes, and were overshadowed by responses alluding to
other concerns such as the stringency of EE targets for 2030 or the regulatory and market
changes required to improve investments in conventional EE measures already considered by
the directive. From the responses to the EED consultations it can be concluded that there is
no dedicated industry stakeholder group that advocates for the implementation of ME.
Specifically referring to energy and climate policies, one interviewee mentioned that policy-
makers tend to resist “any suggested policy change...and if it is not suiting their agenda, they
will probably allow you to write down the changes that they wanted to do anyway inside your
policy measures”. The participant concluded that this limits the extent to which these policies
can be influenced through consultations, as these lead to “a lot of inconsequential very small
changes but no overarching support or impact”. This finding agrees with incrementalist policy
theories, as defended by Lindblom (1959), which state that unless a catastrophe occurs, policy
developments will happen “through a series of relatively small changes”.
4.3 Multiple indicators: tracking material efficiency
A change in an indicator can sometimes bring attention to a particular policy agenda. EE
and ME policy areas are saturated with indicators (see Table A.6 in the Appendix), which
means policymakers need to interpret their relative importance. Evidence suggests that ME
metrics are inadequate, mainly because these often exclude the embodied energy reductions
associated with reductions in the use of energy-intensive materials. However, even when
embodied energy metrics are included, they may carry little weight among policymakers.
Interviewees offered three explanations.
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First, environmental indicators are mostly consumer- rather than producer-centric. One of
the interviewees admitted that the RE and upcoming CE monitoring frameworks “are not
targeted at producers”, but rather at supporting the assessment and labelling of products to
influence consumers. This suggests that embodied-energy-type indicators are more commonly
used to inform end-user decisions and that there is less experience in using these indicators
within climate and energy policies targeted at producers.
Second, the RE, CE and Raw Materials frameworks don’t currently track the energy embodied
in materials. One interviewee explained that doing so would be challenging because the
“market surveillance authorities [...] don’t do life-cycle”, meaning that they do not consider
the energy consumed across the product’s full life. Omitting the upstream energy embodied
in materials weakens the incentives to promote ME as a solution to reduce energy. This lack
of embodied-energy indicators also besets EE policies and the ETS (EC (2009a, 2013)), in
which only direct energy use and emissions are included.
Yet, even if life-cycle type indicators capturing the embodied energy associated with material
use were to be tracked, three interviewees signalled the lack of clarity around LCA and
resource productivity indicators makes them difficult to operationalise and interpret. One
interviewee highlighted that the “measurement of RE was considered very imperfect and there
was a lot of controversy”, but asserted that this “was always acknowledged”. This view was
supported by another interviewee, who explained that “one of the problems with the leading
indicator [was that] it didn’t mean anything to many industries”. Regarding LCA metrics, one
interviewee explained that “embodied energy is a value judgement”. Another said that:
“the more you start to compare at the small scale, the more you are confronted the need to do
allocation [...] if you want to have a subset of a system and compare, then that’s tricky”.
Cooper-Searle et al. (2017) posit that this results partly from the “lack of standardisation”
and partly “from the uncertainty and complexity associated” with these.
Lastly, data available on material flows is limited. As pointed out by one interviewee, the
controversy over the current lead indicator is exacerbated because “there is a lot more data
that is needed, for example the magnitude of waste streams and their energy contents”.
5 Political and institutional factors
Our evidence suggests that four institutional and political factors affect the agenda-setting
process in the EC: its vertical hierarchy and policy ownership (Section 5.1); the behaviour of
individual actors (Section 5.2); and imposed policy inheritance (Section 5.3).
5.1 Vertical hierarchy and horizontal policy ownership
The term vertical hierarchy refers to the interactions between management levels within
the Commission, whereas that of policy ownership refers to the parallel interactions across
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directorates. Section 2.3 mentions the relevance of the mode of issue expansion, for which
Princen and Rhinard (2006) proposed two alternatives: through high- or low-level politics.
Interviews confirm the importance of high-level support in integrating ME across other areas,
and emphasise the Commission’s hierarchical rigidity.
One interviewee explained that a policy agenda will depend on whether “there is a very
important top-down element; who is the Commissioner, who is the President; what priorities
they set” and said that “all of this is a bit beyond our control”. Another suggested that since
2011, there has been a lack of buy-in from political leaders. He argued that “the Commissioner
needs to be on board for this level of change to occur” and that without high-level support they
“couldn’t really ever convince any of the other DGs to take [RE] seriously as an initiative,
because there wasn’t buy-in from the director general”. This also meant that “the rest of the
DG [did] not really get RE or how it might work”.
These statements highlight the relevance of high-level politics within the Commission and
reveal that enacting policy changes is further complicated by the Commission’s “pretty
rigid hierarchy”. To date, there is little evidence that ME is a priority issue for senior EC
representatives in DG Energy and Clima, and that this could help to explain the lack of
prominence it has relative to climate and energy strategies.
Interviews revealed that the cross-directorate policy ownership of environmental, energy
and climate matters can hinder the integration of ME in energy and climate policies. One
interviewee explained: “the Commission [has] silos which have their own agendas and
instruments and even in the same DG there are different units with different objectives and
[...] instruments”.
Another reckoned that better cross-DG coordination is needed: “the director generals need to
talk to other director generals and sell them the benefits of mutual cooperation, then these
would tell the directors who would tell the head of units, who would tell the staff to work
together. But without that everyone is busy doing their own thing”.
Discussing the RE initiative (EC (2011b)), another recalled the poor relationship between
different Directorates: “there was a huge amount of frustration between the Cabinet and DG
environment with the Director general in the middle”. Discussing DG Energy’s involvement in
DG Environment’s report on the “Energy Saving Potential of Increasing Resource Efficiency”
(Mehlhart et al. (2016)), one interviewee from DG Environment mentioned that although they
were involved internally, they were “not tremendously engaged”. In discussing the interactions
between these three DGs, one interviewee explained:
“Everyone wants to control their own policy [...] It’s a big hassle if anyone else tries to change
it. Firstly, because they don’t control it... Secondly, because it makes it more complicated.
Thirdly, because they don’t have the time. Fourthly, because changing policies sometimes
opens up policies to debate [...] which can lead to unforeseen, unwanted changes in the policy
which people are already working on”.
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Yet, the segregation of energy, climate and environmental matters across multiple Directorates
is not unique to the EC. Its pervasiveness also affects national governments and industry
firms. One interviewee explained that, in national governments: “...an energy, economic or
industry department might deal with [...] energy, and then issues [on] resource efficiency and
waste will probably be with an environmental department”.
5.2 Individualism in decision-making
Interviews reflect that the motivations for paying attention to given policy solutions can be
affected by the specific people involved in the decision-making process. Five interviewees men-
tioned the importance of the personality and skills of specific individuals in the development
of both environmental and climate policies.
In reference to the environmental agenda, one interviewee explained that RE “was Potocˇnik’s
thing at the time, and now we have a new Commission and a new Commissioner and the
new big thing is the CE”. While discussing the overlap between EE and the ETS, another
argued that “[Dimas] had his big idea, and didn’t want to jeopardise it” by incorporating EE
improvements. A third interviewee mentioned that in understanding why a specific issue does
not receive attention it is important to consider the “dynamics of the posts and people...who
is in what post and how these people connect with other people in other DGs”.
The skills and previous experience of specific actors were revealed to play a relevant role
in determining the success of an issue in reaching the political agenda. One interviewee
highlighted that “[Commissioner Potocˇnik] came from innovation so he knew a lot about
innovation and about economics [...] and was interested in win-wins between economics and
the environment”. He also explained that the fundamentals behind the RE strategy were
“very much Potocˇnik’s perspective on how things could move forward”.
Section 5.1 revealed that a cross-Directorate issue such as ME, is more likely to become an
energy/emissions instrument if this is promoted from above (i.e. through the high politics
route). The relevance of people’s individual interests highlighted in the interviews suggests
that for ME to be appropriately integrated in energy and climate policies, a high-level
policymaker is likely to need to be personally committed to engineering this. As the EC’s
priorities have been long set (in 2014) and its current term is coming to an end (in 2019), it
seems improbable that any change will occur before a new Commission is elected.
5.3 Policy inheritance
Incorporating ME measures to energy and climate agendas will require overcoming the
resistance imposed by previous policy developments. In this study, interviews confirm that
the hostility faced can be largely attributed to the policy lock-in created by the ETS – the
crux of the EUs climate policy.
Four interviewees agreed that the most feasible option to incorporate ME is to improve the
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ETS in order to make this the main energy/climate policy for heavy industry. Yet, there is
disagreement about how to do this. One stated that “we should improve [the ETS] by turning
it into a global emissions trading system, with a very limited cap that evolves in line with the
Paris agreement”. Other suggestions included appropriately capturing the effect of EE, and
adjusting the carbon price. One interviewee suggested that “getting the price right is the
right thing to do”. Another reckoned that “there is the psychological effect [...] in industry of
extended periods of high prices”.
Other participants were more critical about the effectiveness of changing the ETS. One
contended that “there is evidence that changing the prices might not alter the uptake of
EE” and that they are unlikely to trigger structural changes in firms. Academic experts
support this view and relate the ineffectiveness of carbon prices to four factors: the adoption
of carbon-leakage prevention mechanisms5; the fact that cost effects downstream depend on
mitigation decisions made upstream; imperfect competition and cost pass-through (Skelton
and Allwood (2017)).
Modifying the ETS will also require overcoming resistance from industry stakeholders, who
are anxious to avoid conflicts with other policy areas and concerned about the scheme’s
effect on competitiveness. In an impact assessment, the EC (2015a) reported that: “many
stakeholders claim it is difficult especially since the products are traded on global markets,
while others underline that determining concrete cost-pass through rates may be challenging
as many factors are at play”.
The historical developments of the ETS are key to understanding the options available for
bringing ME into the energy and climate agendas. Indeed, the ‘increasing returns’ dynamic
behind the ETS is likely to be detrimental to both the technical feasibility and the idea
acceptance of integrating ME in energy/climate agendas.
6 Solution readiness
Interviews show that a solution is more likely to receive attention if it: is technically feasible,
aligns with the Commission’s values, and there is consensus among the policy community.
These three aspects are discussed in Sections 6.1-6.3.
6.1 Technical feasibility
For a specific idea to not only stand out, but to “survive to the point of serious consideration”
(Kingdon, 1984), that idea must be technically feasible. One interviewee explained that
the EU has “a very rich set of legislative instruments of different types and [...] also more
potential...there are all sorts of things we could do.” The wide-ranging implications and
drivers for reducing material use, however, make it challenging to develop policies that fully
5For example, in the UK, at least 95% of ETS allowances are allocated for free to the steel sector (Allwood
and Skelton (2017)).
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capture all of its nuances. And as revealed in the interviews, this makes it hard to find
appropriate solutions to leverage the energy- and emissions-saving potential of ME.
One interviewee reckoned that incentivising ME requires “systemic change...going beyond
individual policies to creating the right framework”, i.e. reflecting interdependencies between
industrial energy use and emissions across an entire value chain or sector. Another suggested
that “until we know more it is difficult to know what the right instrument would be”. With
relation to DG Environment’s report on the energy-saving potential of ME (Mehlhart et al.
(2016)), a third interviewee mentioned that they “found it very difficult to come to concrete
policy suggestions” and that “in terms of policy conclusions that could be taken up at the
EU-level, [the report] didn’t really serve that purpose”.
This could be associated with the fact that, as suggested by two interviewees, ME is pro-
hibitively technical, which could make it challenging for policymakers to operationalise. One
believed that there is still “a learning curve that governments and industry need to work
through and it would be quite steep” and “[the Commission] need[s] even more concrete
examples of the energy saving potential of RE”. Another explained that “the thing with RE is
that the concepts are understandable mainly to a technical audience [...] but translating that
into policy is obviously more difficult”.
Despite this complexity, several interviewees offered ideas of how to integrate ME into current
and forthcoming EU policies. One suggested that “the area where you are going to see most
discussion about the relationship between RE and EE is in Eco-design in the next couple of
years”. Developing minimum standards for the ME of new EU appliances/devices, e.g. for
durability or recyclability, can be appealing because Eco-design has low levels of subsidiarity.
This same interviewee further explained that if “a MS wants to see efficiency grow [this
can] rely on better products coming into the market without doing anything other than voting
for it in the [EU’s] decision-making process”. Another proposed modifying environmental
policies: “there are other policies that are important, water and waste legislation...anything
that improves processes, so the IED has some impact on resource use”. The IED develops
the BREFs – best practice reference documents – which provide guidance on EE options for
sites to reduce emissions. Albeit not covering CO2 emissions, BREFs could provide technical
support if the given ME measures proposed also reduce other emissions.
For these ideas to materialise into policies, they would need to get buy-in from multiple
directorates and policy areas. Yet, in practice this may prove challenging. One interviewee
reflected on the current lack of integration between energy and climate policies, “it is really
frustrating that they didn’t want to factor in EE into the ETS [...] this has been extremely
harmful to energy and climate policies over the past 10 years”. This could result from
organisational and political factors. As one interviewee speculated “[DG Clima] didn’t want
to have anything to do with EE. [Policymakers in charge of] the ETS never really wanted
industrial EE regulation to happen”. Challenges faced in integrating energy and climate
policies could act as frictional barriers towards incorporating a third policy area.
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Interviewees also mentioned operational factors that may affect technical feasibility. One
mentioned the fact that policymakers “are dealing in some cases with data issues”, specially
in policies on secondary material use, where “sharing data across the system is necessary to
ensure the quality of recycled material”. Another reckoned that there is a lack of methods
to ensure that MSs “are accounting properly for what happens in their territory or in other
people’s territory”.
The technical feasibility of integrating ME into energy/climate strategies is not fully under-
stood. However, interviewees perceive that integrating ME incentives into climate and energy
policy will be taxing because of institutional, political and operational factors.
6.2 Idea acceptance
For policymakers to accept an idea, everyone in the policy community would need to have a
similar understanding of what the idea is. This, however, is not the case for ME.
Although participants were all familiar with the term ‘material efficiency’, its exact interpre-
tation varied. Most participants were only familiar with a selection of ME measures, but did
not acknowledge that they encompass an umbrella of strategies (see Allwood et al. (2011)).
Two recognised material by-product use as a ME strategy. One gave the example of “the
use of slags of course [...] the slag you can valorise for cement use”. Another mentioned
industrial symbiosis, “...[in] a steel plant that produces some gases in the blast furnace, we
have CO and so this can be a feedstock in the chemical industry”. Two other interviewees gave
recycling as the main example. Others were even disparaging about its value; one interviewee
voiced concern over the lack of a widely-accepted definition: “[RE] is just a buzzword, it
means many different things to many people”.
Beyond the lack of common understanding, the interviews revealed other two factors that
might impact on idea acceptance: confusion over the link between energy and material use,
and the potential trade offs and conflicts with other policy goals.
When asked about the link between material and energy use, three interviewees interpreted
this as the resource use associated with EE actions, as opposed to the energy savings from
reducing material use. For example, one mentioned the “need to know more about the resource
impact of our policies”. Another argued that “if you improve processes to save emissions
you might have some resource savings at the margins, but I don’t think the resource impact is
currently quantified”. Only one interviewee mentioned that “it’s important to acknowledge
that there is obviously embedded energy and embedded energy cost that are in materials that is
potentially wasted as part of industrial processes”.
Some interviewees believed that leveraging ME’s energy-saving potential may be challenged
by the need to simultaneously support other drivers. One explained that if ME is merely
driven by its energy- or emissions-saving implications this would “help on some resources but
not on others”. Another said that ‘‘there are situations where they might work against each
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other. Some measures can conflict or contradict”. Another believed that “EE doesn’t help
in the circularity argument” and that “EE policies are not in sync with the transition to a
circular economy”. Three participants mentioned contradictions in the buildings sector. One
explained that “EE policies are only linked to use-phase consumption” and that they “are
not looking at the whole system, so they are coming up with bad measures”. Although there
was no mention of heavy industries, perceived conflicts in other sectors, such as buildings,
can influence policymakers’ disposition to intervene.
6.3 Entrepreneurship
Kingdon (1984) posits that policy solutions gain prominence through multiple channels,
including concerted activities by policy entrepreneurs inside and outside the responsible public
institutions. In this context, policy entrepreneurs are advocates who promote specific policy
solutions in the hope for future gains “in the form of material, purposive or solidary benefits”
(Kingdon, 1984). In this study, entrepreneurship is understood to be important in raising the
profile of ME solutions in the EC, as suggested by the empirical data collected.
Interviews unveil the relevance of expert institutions. For example, one interviewee mentioned
specific researchers that promote certain ME measures: “in the working group the European
Energy Research Alliance also have their word in defining priorities”. Another revealed that
the European association of SPIRE (2017) is particularly influential. Yet, despite the existence
of some support, some interviewees suggested the need for more. One stated: “I think the fact
that the IEA hasn’t covered [ME] that much means that in some cases policymakers haven’t
seen it either”. The IEA’s limited promotion of ME to date may have a definite effect on EU
policymakers, as the agency’s reports are considered trustworthy sources of expertise.
This agrees with Klu¨ver (2013), who contends that for highly technical issues, the EC has
to rely heavily on lobbying groups as these possess expert information. The author believes
that in these cases the general population is likely to be less engaged. In fact, Smith (2017)
concludes that media coverage on ME consists of “sparse rehearsals” that critique consumption,
and that “the relationship between environmental change, material consumption and everyday
life” must be re-framed and made more positive and tangible.
Less prominent is the support provided by industry stakeholders. One interviewee claimed
that the EC “would not want to undermine the position of industry”, and that for an idea to
become part of the industrial policy agenda, this would at least require buy-in from industry
itself: “ideas have to come from industrial stakeholders”. Yet, while EC officials mentioned
the relevance of industry in the development of industrial policies in general, they did not
mention the existence of a group that promotes ME as an energy/climate solution.
Despite the existence of some ME advocates (e.g. the European Climate Foundation (Circle
Economy, 2017)) interviewees did not reference a lobby group that specifically promotes ME
as an energy/climate solution. This suggests that either there are insufficient proponents of
ME for industry or that their initiatives have had little success in reaching influential decision-
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makers. The latter may be due to the fact that support for ME is relatively recent. However,
measuring the role played by entrepreneurs and the impact these have on policymakers
decisions is an extremely taxing endeavour; it is difficult to capture the effort going in to
promote an idea and the involvement of specific entrepreneurs is rarely mentioned.
7 Policy implications: potential interventions
The above sections evaluate the factors preventing ME from becoming part of the EU’s energy
and climate agendas. Although ex-ante analyses make it impossible to know how events will
unravel, the knowledge gathered places us in a good position to make future suggestions. Table
5 (spread over three pages) summarises the avenues that could be explored to incentivise the
adoption of ME as an industrial energy/climate tool. This table compiles a list of interventions
that are based on suggestions made by interviewees and on solutions recommended in the
literature. Interventions are classified according to the degree (whether a minor, intermediate
o major change) and type of change that is required (whether informational, technical,
financial, legislative, executive, or administrative).
If the ETS remains the province of industrial climate policies and the evidence presented
above proves accurate, sudden events and institutional turnovers are most likely to trigger the
policy changes required to integrate ME in climate/energy agendas. Potential outside events
that could initiate a policy shift include: (1) the unexpected shortage of a given resource; (2)
unforeseen trade tariffs on energy-intensive materials, e.g. Americas new tariffs on steel; (3)
the need for new climate deals as a result of Brexit.
In the upcoming decade, one predictable window during which discussion on the integration
of ME might be initiated, is the next revision of the ETS. But even if policymakers, industry
stakeholders and Member States were to agree to make pertinent modifications to the ETS,
this window is subject to the slow pace of change in EU-level policymaking: ETS revisions
made at this time are not expected to come into effect until after 2030. The entrance of the
new Commission in 2019 presents another opportunity for such discussion; though, again,
even if the new Commission makes the integration of ME a firm objective, required policy
interventions are unlikely to be enacted within their five-year term.6
A third potential catalyst for change is in the revisions of complementary measures, for
example, Articles 7 or 8 in the EED. If ETS modifications prove challenging and lengthy,
increasing the stringency and scope of EU-level energy and/or environmental policies becomes
an effective alternative. The main drawback to this alternative is, again, that these policies
are likely to be enacted after 2030.
There are multiple reasons why EU-level action is preferred for incentivising ME: the interna-
tional nature of supply-chains; the ability of EU-backed initiatives to pool public resources
and attract the required quantity of private investment; the fact the EU is responsible for the
6It is possible that Brexit negotiations trigger an unforeseen revision of the ETS in 2019. It is, however,
uncertain whether these negotiations will open up the opportunity to revise other provisions.
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governance of a large number of environmental and energy issues. However, given the barriers
just discussed, it appears that major, short-term policy interventions at the EU-level are
limited. The policy shift required to leverage ME as an instrument to reach energy/climate
targets will therefore require action from Member States, industry and academics.
8 Conclusions
This article was motivated by the lack of an existing explanation on why material efficiency is
currently not part of the EU’s energy/climate agendas. By conducting interviews, reviewing
policy documents, and expanding upon three policy theories – including rational choice
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and Multiple Stream Framework – we evaluate
why this is the case. Combining these three theories provided a richer understanding of the
factors influencing the Commission’s agenda-setting process, than either framework would
have given in isolation.
Our analysis suggests that the lack of integration of ME in energy and climate policies stems
from a combination of contributing factors: difficulties in reframing the prevailing rationale
to pursue material efficiency; the inadequacy of monitored indicators; the lack of high-level
political buy-in from DG Energy and Clima; the ETS policy lock-in; uncoordinated policy
management across multiple Directorates; and the lack of a designated industry lobby.
Time to integrate material efficiency in the EU’s energy and climate strategies is limited
and there are no easy solutions to do so. Yet, with adequate high-level political will, a
plethora of policy actions can be executed to achieve this. Based on this evidence and the
proposed interventions, we emphasise the need for Member States and industry stakeholders
to drive the transition to a low-carbon heavy industry in the EU. Given the key role to be
played by Member States and industry firms, the study’s remit could logically be expanded
to investigate the attitudes, expectations and ambitions of these stakeholders.
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A.1 Additional information for the literature review
Table A.1 and A.2 provide an extensive summary of the policies reviewed in this study.
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Table A.3 outlines the main features of the two issue-expansion routes described by Princen
and Rhinard (2006).
Table A.3: Summary of features of the ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’ routes for agenda-setting in the EU (Princen
and Rhinard (2006))
Features High politics Low politics
Originating actors
(issue expansion)
High-ranking political figures, e.g. Com-
missioners
Low-ranking Commission experts, e.g.
civil servants in specific units
Problems stream Crises, symbolic events, public mood Changes in indicators, policy feedback
Risk of issue en-
trance
High-level attention rapidly shifts to new
issues causing political impetus to fade
Can be blocked by high-level politicians
Opportunity of is-
sue entrance
Large political impetus for change once
high-level politicians have committed
Solid ‘self-sustaining dynamic’ by slowly
expanding EU activity upwards
Table A.4 summarises recent MSF studies applied to the context of the EU.
Table A.4: Summary of MSF studies applied to the context of the EU, modified from Herweg (2016)
Study Policy stage Policy issue
Adaptation
Streams Window Entre-
preneurs
Bozzini (2017) Entire process Pesticide regulation - - -
Fuchs (2017) Decision-making Environmental governance No No Yes
Herweg (2016) Agenda-setting Natural gas regulation Yes Yes Yes
Copeland and James (2014) Decision-making Economic reform No No Yes
Bache (2013) Agenda-setting Quality of life Yes No No
Grugel and Iusmen (2013) Agenda-setting Childrens rights policy Yes No No
Ackrill et al. (2013) Entire process Theory Yes Yes Yes
Maltby (2013) Agenda-setting Energy policy integration Yes No Yes
Ackrill and Kay (2011) Decision-making 2005 Sugar reform No Yes Yes
Borra´s and Radaelli (2011) Decision-making Lisbon strategy gover-
nance
Yes No No
Kaunert and Giovanna
(2010)
Decision-making Counter-terrorist financing
cooperation
Yes No Yes
Zahariadis (2008) Entire process General theory Yes Yes Yes
Brunner (2008) Agenda-setting German emissions trading No No No
Richardson (2001) Entire process General theory Yes Yes Yes
A.2 Additional information for the method
Table A.5 summarises the types of documents reviewed in this study.
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Table A.5: Summary of policy documents reviewed
Type of document Acronym Institution Time reviewed
Commission meetings minutes PV Commission 2012-2017
Draft meeting minutes Council PV Council 2014-2016
European Citizen Initiatives - Commission 2012-2017
Legislation proposals COM Commission 2014-2017
Action plans COM Commission 2011-2017
Roadmaps COM Commission 2011-2017
Flagship initiatives COM Commission 2011-2017
Documents relating to official instruments C Commission 2011-2017
Staff Working Documents (progress reports, impact
assessments etc.)
SWD Commission 2014-2017
Public consultations - Commission 2000-2017
Own-initiative reports INI Parliament 2014-2017
Resolutions TA Parliament 2014-2017
Inter-institutional procedures Eurlex -
National energy efficiency action plans - Commission 2012-2017
Annual reports - IEA 2014-2017
Annual reports - EEA 2010-2017
Resource efficiency report - International
Resource Panel
2015-2017
Table A.6: List of most relevant indicators, sourced from Humphris-Bach et al. (2015); EC (2016c); EC et al. (2012).
Indicator Unit Recent progress
Energy use
Energy intensity Gross inland consumption of energy divided
by Gross Domestic Product
Decreasing since 2006
Energy intensity Gigajoules per tonne output Decreasing
Gross inland energy use Million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) Fluctuating (decrease between
2012-2014, increase in 2015)
Energy productivity GDP (calculated in PPS) per gross inland
consumption of energy
Increasing but too slow
Energy dependence Net energy imports as % of total energy use Increasing since 2001
Material use
Resource productivity GDP per Raw Material Consumption Increasing since 2000
Resource use per capita Domestic material consumption per popula-
tion
Decreasing since 2008 but
progress too slow
Material costs Percentage of gross production value High
Metal prices Euros 13% increase between 2010-2020
Waste
Generation of waste ex-
cluding major minerals
Waste generation (kg/capita/year) Decreasing since 2004 but
progress too slow
Landfill rate of waste ex-
cluding major minerals
Percentage of waste sent to landfill Decreasing since 2010
End-of-life recycling in-
put rates (EOL-RIR)
Percentage of end-of-life mass input versus
total mass input
No trend available but currently
low
Environmental impacts
Product footprint Impact per function unit (e.g. kgCO2/ kg
product output)
Progress over time not found
Organisation footprint Impact per function unit Progress over time not found
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B Supplementary Material
B.1 Understanding the European Union
In Europe, political agendas exist at multiple levels, such as that of individual Member
States (MSs) or of the EU. In the area of energy and environmental matters, the EU has had
legislative authority since the European Single Act was enforced in 1987. The environment
was made an official EU policy area in 1993 as part of the Treaty of Maastricht, with its
relevance strengthened fifteen years later through the Treaty of Lisbon (in 2009), where
mitigating climate change became an official goal . In parallel to this, the development of a
common EU energy policy began in 2005 with the development of the Action Plan on Energy
Efficiency. This was adopted a year later, in 2006, after the publication of a Green paper on
“A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy” . It therefore makes
sense to establish the remit of this analysis at the EU level rather than at that of individual
Member States (MSs).
B.1.1 How does the EU’s legislative process work?
Legislation in the EU can be issued in three forms, namely through directives, decisions
or regulations. In directives, the aim is to lay out ‘policy principles’, in which case the
results are binding, but the implementation into national law is left for MSs to decide. In
regulations, both the results and the implementation are defined and must be applied to all
MSs. Decisions, like regulations, are also entirely binding. However, these are often targeted
at specific actors or sectors, rather than to entire MSs.
B.1.2 The ordinary legislative procedure
In the EU, the Commission has the legislative initiative, that is, it is the only body that can
“formally propose laws” . However, the European Parliament hereafter: the Parliament) and
the European Council (hereafter: the Council) have the right to request that the Commission
submit a proposal. The Parliament then decides whether to adopt it or amend it. During
this first reading, the Council can decide to accept the position adopted by Parliament, in
which case the proposed legislation is adopted, or it can decide to amend this and return
the proposal back to Parliament for a second reading. If amendments are requested, then
the Parliament has three options, it can: (1) approve the Councils position, in which case
the act is approved; (2) propose amendments, in which case the proposal is returned for a
second reading in the Council; (3) reject it, in which case the procedure terminates. If the
proposal is returned to Council for a second reading, this must decide whether to approve the
proposed amendments, in which case the legislation is adopted, or to reject these, triggering
the convening of the Conciliation Committee. In the Parliament’s website, it is noted that
“the vast majority of European laws are adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the
Council” .
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B.1.3 The origins of legislation
Although the Commission is the sole initiator of legislation, Nugent (2001) Nugent and
Rhinard (2001) explains that they do not “act wholly on the basis of [their] own ideas and
preferences” and that the indeed the “origins of EU legislation are many and varied”. The
author names four main origins of legislation: (1) the need to honour treaties or obligations;
(2) the need to adjust or develop existing legislation; (3) the official requests made by the
Parliament, the European Council, the Council of Ministers or other European committees;
(4) the unofficial requests made by influential interest groups. Within these, the need to
adjust or develop existing legislation, referred to as policy inheritance hereafter, is identified
as the most common reason behind the proposal of legislation.
B.1.4 The functioning of Commission
In investigating why ME never made it into the energy policy agenda, it is key to under-
stand the structure in which policy-making is operationalised. The Commission is divided
into a political (College of Commissioners) and an administrative (services) branch, both
of which are headed by the Commission President and Vice-Presidents. The College of
Commissioners is the collective “responsible for the decisions and actions taken in the name
of the Commission” . This is composed of 28 members, one from each MS, including the
President and Vice-Presidents. Each Commissioner is given responsibility for a specific policy
area. To operationalise the policy-making process, the Commission has the administrative
branch, i.e. the services. These are organised into departments, most of which are denoted
Directorate Generals (DGs). DGs are supported by other departments, denoted as ‘services’
and executive agencies. DGs are then further divided into Directorates, each of which is
headed by ‘directors’. In turn, each Directorate is composed of units headed by ‘heads of
unit’.
At the time of writing (October 2017), there are 33 DGs, 16 service departments and 6
executive agencies. The three most relevant DGs to this study are DG ENERGY, DG
ENVIRONMENT and DG CLIMA. DG ENERGY is organised into 5 Directorates, which
consist of 17 individual units. Within this, there is one unit specifically tasked with Energy
efficiency, under Directorate C. DG ENVIRONMENT is organised into 6 Directorates, divided
into 24 thematic units. Within this, there are two units relevant to this work, the units tasked
with: (1) ‘circular economy and green growth’; and (2) Implementation & Support to Member
States, under which environmental assessments are developed. DG CLIMA is organised into
4 Directorates (one of which is shared with DG ENVIRONMENT), and 17 units. Within the
Commission, the DGs are the entities directly responsible for preparing legislative proposals.
A lead DG is assigned to each proposal according to its policy remit. In the case of a dispute
between two DGs over the leadership of a policy proposal, the Secretariat General comes into
action. This is an entity within the Commission, which is tasked with ensuring the general
coherence of the Commission’s work.
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Table B.1 summarises the key MSF studies for the EU.
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B.2 Adaptions to MSF
...give more details about how this was adapted from previous studies?
Table B.2: Classification of ME measures
Material efficiency (production) Material sufficiency (consumption)
Waste reduction Reduced waste during processing re-
duces material requirements
Extended product
lifetime
Design and maintenance of
longer lasting products
Recycling Increased recycling reduces deple-
tion of natural reserves and in-
creases energy consumption
Shift from goods
to services
Reduce requirements for
individual ownership
Light-weighting Reduced material inputs through
the design of lighter products
Material/product
substitution
Substitution of high-carbon inten-
sive materials with low-carbon ones
Lifetime optimisa-
tion
Change behaviour so that
products are used for full,
optimised lifetime
Synergies By-product use across sectors
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Table B.3: Summary of EU-funded projects related to ME in industry
Project title Start/End Sector Aspect of ME studied
MORE (Monitoring Resource Effi-
ciency)
2015-17 Chemicals/ petro-
chemicals industries
Recycling, reduction of yield
loss and raw material inputs
ENLIGHT (Enhanced Lightweight De-
sign)
2012-14 Automotive sector (
electric vehicles)
Light-weighting
SuPLight (Sustainable and efficient
Production of Lightweight solutions)
2011-14 Automotive sector (fo-
cus on aluminium)
Re-using, recycling and light-
weighting
DESIRE (Development of a System
of Indicators for a Resource efficient
Europe)
2012-16 National, EU and
global, industry and
product group level
Resource use indicator devel-
opment
CRM INNONET (Critical Raw Mate-
rials Innovation Network)
2007 Industry Material, product, service,
process substitution
ZEROWIN (Towards Zero Waste in
Industrial Networks)
2009-14 Automotive, photo-
voltaic, construction/
demolition sectors
Waste prevention (re-use and
recycling), industrial symbio-
sis
REECOVER (Recovery of Rare Earth
Elements)
2014-17 Raw material sector
(WEEE recycling and
iron ore industries)
Recycling
TOP-REF (Tools for monitoring and
assessing Resource-efficiency in the
value Chain or Process Industry)
2014-17 Energy-intensive
industries
Recycling, reduction of yield
loss and raw material inputs
COCOP (Coordinating Optimisation
of Complex Industrial Processes)
2016- Copper and steel in-
dustries
Plant-wide optimisation (ma-
terial use reduction)
CoPro (Improved energy and resource
efficiency by better coordination of
production in the process industries)
2016-20 Chemicals and petro-
chemicals industries
Plant-wide optimisation (ma-
terial use reduction)
RESLAG (Turning waste into value) 2015-19 Steel industry Reduction of material by-
product loss
FISSAC (Fostering Industrial Symbio-
sis for a Sustainable Resource Inten-
sive Industry across the extended Con-
struction Value Chain)
2015-20 Construction value
chain
Waste prevention, industrial
symbiosis
EPOS (Enhanced energy and resource
Efficiency and Performance in process
industry Operations via onsite and
cross-sectorial Symbiosis)
2015-20 Energy-intensive
industries
Industrial symbiosis
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